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Abstract 
Along with macroeconomic stabilization and liberalization of commercial activity, 
privatization is a central pillar of transition from post-socialism to a market economy. 
Privatization transfers inefficient state-owned enterprises to private owners, promoting 
"hard budget constraints" and economic incentives for managers in place of political 
incentives. Although privatization is only one step in the process of enterprise 
restructuring, it is a key element and certainly the one which has received the most 
attention.  
Privatization in Ukraine started slowly. Serious discussion among Ukrainian 
policymakers about privatization began around 1990, and by 1992 Ukraine adopted its 
main privatization laws. However several years later, by December 1994, very few 
enterprises had actually been privatized, mostly on a case-by-case basis.  
At the end of 1994, with the support and cajoling of western donors, Ukraine 
launched a revised mass privatization program. Although this revised program alleviated 
many of the problems that previously had blocked privatization, the speed of privatization 
nevertheless did not pick up as much as was expected and needed. By the end of June 
1995, less than 200 medium and large enterprises had competed the mass privatization 
program, out of 8000 enterprises targeted for privatization in 1995.  
This paper recounts and analyzes privatization in Ukraine from 1990 to 1995 in light 
of the lessons learned by East European countries and Russia. Part I of this paper recounts 
the experience of privatization in Ukraine from the beginning until late 1995. Part II of 
the paper presents an analysis of privatization in Ukraine, identifying problems and 
suggesting possible improvements.  D. Snelbecker 
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PART I: THE UKRAINIAN PRIVATIZATION EXPERIENCE  
1. Overview of Privatization in Ukraine, 1990 - 1994  
Discussions about the need for privatization in Ukraine began in 1990 among 
progressive Ukrainian policymakers, shortly after similar discussions began in 
neighboring Poland and Czechoslovakia. Through 1990 and 1991, Ukrainian 
policymakers acquired basic understanding of the defining characteristics of private 
property, the economic importance of privatization, and privatization methods being 
proposed in Eastern Europe. At first, most information came to Ukrainian policymakers 
from two western organizations established in Kiev in 1990 (Harvard's Project on 
Economic Reform in Ukraine and the Council of Advisors to the Parliament), from the 
visits and writing of economists Roman Frydman and Adrzej Rapaczynski, from 
Ukrainians' visits to the US and to Poland, and from the initial visits to Ukraine of the 
World Bank and the International Monetary Fund in late 1991. The concept of voucher 
privatization and the use of financial intermediaries in mass privatization was introduced 
to Ukrainian policymakers in 1990 by the Project on Economic Reform in Ukraine, who 
had contacts with advisors in Poland who were discussing similar proposals. A promise of 
voucher privatization was even written into the economic platform of the Ukrainian 
Republican Party in 1990.  
Through 1991 and early 1992, these privatization discussions solidified into legal 
acts, first the Concept on De-statization and Privatization of State Enterprises, Land, and 
Housing, from December 1991, and then three laws on privatization in early 1992: the 
Law on Privatization of the Property of State Enterprises, the Law on Privatization of 
Small State Enterprises (Small Privatization Law), and the Law on Privatization 
Certificates.  
Before the adoption of these laws and the first Privatization Program, in August 
1992, only a thimbleful of ad hoc privatizations took place. The most well known of these 
was the privatization of Lviv's Electron Television Factory in which shares were given to 
workers after special permission was granted by the government in Kiev. This D. Snelbecker 
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privatization was done under the leadership of Viktor Pynzenyk, currently Vice Prime 
Minister and then Director of the Lviv Management Institute.  
The privatization laws and programs have divided enterprises into six categories:  
Group A [1] — small enterprises, with asset values under 33 billion karbovantsi. 
(Cutoff points for determining categories have frequently been re-indexed to account for 
high inflation. These cutoff points used here come from the 1996 draft Privatization 
Program from Fall 1995. In Fall 1995 the exchange rate was roughly 170,000 coupons to 
the US dollar.)  
Group B — medium enterprises, with assets between 33 billion and 2150 billion 
karbovantsi, and with a level of assets per worker not higher than 1.5 times the value of a 
privatization certificate, and not belonging to Group D.  
Group C — medium enterprises, with assets between 33 billion and 2150 billion 
karbovantsi, and with a level of assets per worker higher than 1.5 times the value of a 
privatization certificate, and not belonging to Group D.  
Group D — Enterprises that have asset values greater than 2150 billion karbovantsi, 
or that have been declared monopolists, or that are in the military-industrial complex, or 
that will be privatized to foreign investors.  
Group E — Objects of unfinished construction or of liquidated enterprises.  
Group F — State-owned shares in enterprises that are of mixed ownership (eg, part 
state-owned and part privately held).  
A number of allowable privatization methods were specified in the legislation: 
auction, tender, non-commercial tender (in which bidders compete on the basis of 
promised investment or adherence to certain conditions, rather than on the basis of price), 
leasing with buyout, buyout, public offerings of shares on stock markets, foreign 
investment, etc. Most of these methods could be employed using cash or privatization 
certificates.  
Privatization certificates were to be given to each citizen "on account" in the bank 
rather than in a paper form. Although officials recognized that paper certificates would be 
easier for citizens to understand and use, they feared that the government did not have the The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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logistical ability to issue and distribute so many millions of pieces of paper, so they opted 
for certificates "on account" in special accounts in savings banks.  
Citizens were not allowed to sell their certificates for cash, but they were allowed to 
trade them for shares in financial intermediaries. Policymakers recognized the need for 
financial intermediaries in the privatization process, but they feared that allowing full 
tradability of vouchers would eventually result in foreigners' acquiring all Ukraine's 
productive enterprises (especially foreigners from other CIS countries).  
Early drafts of the privatization laws specified that the value of privatization 
certificates given to each citizen would depend on their age, the number of years they 
worked, their contribution to the society or other factors. The final laws gave all citizens 
an equal value of certificates, avoiding what otherwise would have been a logistical 
quagmire.  
In the privatization process, workers were given certain privileges, including the 
priority right to buy shares in their own enterprises on advantageous terms using 
certificates and cash. Workers had the priority right using their privatization certificates to 
acquire shares in their own enterprises at book value. Additionally, workers could use 
their own cash, up to 50% of the nominal value of their privatization certificates, to 
acquire more shares at book value. Since book value was often quite low, this feature 
gave workers considerable privileges. This process of acquiring shares on privileged 
terms was called "closed subscription," in contrast with the subsequent "open" process of 
selling shares for cash or certificates to outside buyers. Note that Group B enterprises are 
those medium- and large-sized enterprises which theoretically could be totally acquired 
by workers if they use all the certificates and cash which they are eligible to use on 
advantageous terms. Group C enterprises are those medium- and large-sized enterprises 
which could not be totally acquired by workers even if they use all the certificates and 
cash which they are eligible to use on advantageous terms.  
These privileges were one of many compromises between those who supported 
privatization mostly to workers and those who believed workers should be given no 
special privileges. The former either believed that justice required a transfer of property to 
the people who worked at that property, or they believed that any privatization that D. Snelbecker 
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minimized worker participation would not succeed politically. The latter believed that 
worker control of enterprises would lead to a Yugoslav-type floundering of the economy 
because workers would be ineffective, undisciplined owners.  
The final versions of the privatization laws that were adopted by the Parliament 
were in many ways far more progressive and likely to be effective than earlier drafts and 
than programs being discussed in other countries. The final privatization laws, unlike 
earlier drafts, emphasized giving shares directly to workers as individuals rather than to 
collectives, and favored "open" stock companies (in which shares can be freely traded) to 
"closed" stock companies (in which shares cannot be sold without permission of other 
shareholders). Giving shares to collectives rather than to individuals and allowing closed 
rather than open stock companies would have greatly increased worker control and 
impeded the development of capital markets. Their exclusion from the laws was an 
important victory for market reform.  
Original drafts of laws required that workers hold the shares they receive in 
privatization for a minimum of three years before re-selling. This was because of a fear 
that foreigners would quickly buy shares from Ukrainians, acquiring control over 
Ukraine's productive assets. Such a requirement would have destroyed all prospects for 
capital liquidity, making it virtually impossible for inefficient owners to sell to more 
efficient owners. Fortunately, a compromise was reached between advocates and 
opponents of this proposal, and a clause was added to the law making it possible for 
workers to sell their shares anytime after the introduction of a Ukrainian currency. 
Policymakers thought (incorrectly) that the existence of a Ukrainian currency would 
somehow create a barrier that would lessen the possibility of outsiders' coming into 
Ukraine to purchase privatized enterprises.  
Initial interpretation of this clause was that trade could only start after introduction 
of the hryvna — the Ukrainian national currency whose introduction seemed imminent 
for several years. Subsequent interpretation, however, identified the kupon- karbovanets 
(the "temporary" currency already in circulation) as a national currency and permitted 
trade immediately. Pressure by those who were eager to begin buying and selling these 
enterprises forced this re-interpretation. Because of the relative simplicity of privatization 
by worker buyout followed by secondary sale to large investors (compared to other forms The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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of privatization), almost all privatization involving large investors has happened through 
worker buyout of the enterprise followed by purchase of shares by investors from the 
workers. This is true for participation of foreign investors as well as domestic investors.  
According to the law, almost any party could initiate privatization of an enterprise, 
including workers and managers, the central State Property Fund, local privatization 
authorities, Ukrainian citizens, and foreign citizens and organizations. For each enterprise, 
a privatization plan had to be developed and approved by a special privatization 
commission established for each privatizing enterprise. Developing a privatization plan 
was a cumbersome process, requiring an extensive inventorization and valuation of the 
enterprise. On the commissions were to sit representatives of the workers, the managers, 
the State Property Fund, the Antimonopoly Committee, the branch ministries, local 
authorities, and potential buyers.  
A central role in the privatization process was played by the "buyers' association" — 
a poorly defined group of people taking primary responsibility for developing the 
privatization plan. The buyers' associations theoretically could include anyone but in 
practice were made up almost entirely of workers and managers.  The convoluted rules for 
preparing a privatization plan for each enterprise, approved by a privatization committee 
that would represent so many different interests, made privatization of thousands of 
enterprises en masse practically impossible in spite of a legislative framework that 
theoretically called for rapid mass privatization. However, case-by-case privatization, 
usually in which workers and managers bought their own enterprises and sometimes sold 
them to outside investors, was possible and became the primary method of large-
enterprise privatization.  
Except for a few important events, described immediately below, the general 
privatization legislation did not change much between 1992 and the end of 1994. The 
Privatization Programs of 1992, 1993, and 1994, which filled in the details into the laws 
each year, were all fairly similar to each other.  
 
 
 D. Snelbecker 
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2. Leasing  
One of the most important issues over the 1992-1995 period is leasing. Leasing is a 
form of enterprise control dating to pre- independence Soviet law in which workers and 
managers would lease "their" enterprises from the state. The original Ukraine-specific 
legislation governing leasing was written in 1992. According to this legislation, workers 
had the priority right to lease their enterprises without having to seek approval from the 
state. Leased enterprises were controlled almost entirely by the workers, unlike regular 
state-owned enterprises, which were tightly controlled by ministries. Leasing enterprises 
also paid tiny rents to the government for their lease rights, which often were not adjusted 
for high inflation.  
As a result, leasing was a very attractive form of enterprise control and was chosen 
at many small and large enterprises, particularly when the threat of privatization to 
outsiders arose. Given the advantageous conditions for leasing enterprises, such 
enterprises were in little hurry to privatize. Leasing soon became a major impediment to 
Ukraine's privatization process.  
In May 1993, another decree was issued which sought to change the incentives for 
leasing. Leasing enterprises were still given priority rights, but measures were also taken 
to push them toward privatization. Leasing enterprises would either have to purchase their 
enterprises, or risk having the enterprise privatized to outsiders or the lease terminated.  
Conditions for leasing changed several times over the 1992- 1994 period as political 
power shifted back and forth, particularly in the Parliament, between proponents and 
opponents of leasing. Although a moratorium was eventually placed on further leasing, a 
significant portion of Ukrainian state-owned enterprises had converted to this type of 
enterprise control. As a consequence, leasing with buyout became a significant form of 
privatization both for large and for small enterprises.  
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3. Small-scale privatization  
An important initial milestone in small-scale privatization occurred on February 20, 
1993, in Lviv, when the State Property Fund and the Lviv municipal authorities, with the 
technical assistance of the International Finance Corporation, ran the first auction in 
Ukraine for small enterprises. Seventeen restaurants and shops were sold for cash to the 
highest bidders, nine of whom were worker collectives.  
It was hoped that the so-called Lviv model would set a precedent for small-scale 
privatization, to be repeated across the country until almost all small enterprises were 
privatized. Although many auctions did follow the initial Lviv one, a number of problems 
impeded rapid progress. First was the question of leasing rights, discussed above. Because 
during most of the 1993 - 1994 time period workers had a priority right to lease and then 
buy-out their enterprises, workers frequently were able to block privatization of small 
enterprises, and they had an incentive to do so. Workers frequently feared the cash 
auctions because they did not want to lose control of "their" enterprises or risk losing their 
jobs at the hands of new owners. When enterprises were put on lists to be auctioned, 
workers frequently initiated the process of becoming leased enterprises followed by a 
slow buy-out procedure. Once leased, enterprises had little incentive to move quickly with 
buy-out. Such moves prevented local authorities from moving rapidly with privatization.  
Partially, this problem was addressed over time by restricting possibilities for 
leasing, and partially this problem was addressed by encouraging leased enterprises to 
buy out quickly so that lease- with-buyout became a genuine method of privatization, 
along with cash auctions, in the small privatization process.  
A second problem in the small privatization process arose because of distribution of 
revenues from small-scale privatization. Originally, local governments kept the revenues 
from cash auctions, giving them incentives to privatize rapidly. Then, the rules were 
changed so that the central government received fifty percent of revenues and local 
governments the other fifty percent. This greatly reduced the incentives for local 
governments to implement small-scale privatization, so they began to balk, and the pace 
of enterprise sales greatly decreased. Later, the division of revenues changed again, 
giving 80% to local governments and 20% to the central government. Predictably, the D. Snelbecker 
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privatization pace increased after this change. Also, in December 1994, a presidential 
decree instituted a number of measures to block further leasing of enterprises and to push 
those enterprises already under leasing toward privatization.  
Although auctions had been a primary means of small-scale privatization in Russia, 
in Ukraine buyout (either after leasing or directly for state ownership) become the most 
common method. Even western advisors in Ukraine eventually shifted attention to buy 
out, recognizing that auctions were not working well. As an example of the prevalence of 
buyout over auction, note that, according to unofficial inside sources, roughly 1000 small 
enterprises under communal (local government) ownership in the second quarter of 1995 
were privatized by buyout, while only around 100 enterprises were privatized by auction. 
Although not all periods were so skewed toward buyout, it is interesting to note the much 
greater prevalence of buyout in Ukraine than in other countries, such as Russia.  
 
4. The 1994 Privatization Moratorium  
In July 1994, the newly elected Parliament passed the resolution "On Perfection of 
the Privatization Mechanism in Ukraine and Intensifying the Control of Its Conduct" — 
popularly called the privatization moratorium. Specifically, the resolution forbade 
privatization by cash sales of medium and large enterprises. Technically, privatization of 
small enterprises (in communal property) and sale of shares for certificates were not 
affected. In reality however, partially because of ignorance about the resolution and 
partially because of attempts to use the resolution as an excuse for blocking privatization 
by opponents of privatization, even certificate and small privatization slowed during the 
period of the moratorium.  
The moratorium forbade most cash privatization until a list of enterprises to be 
excluded from privatization would be adopted. The moratorium had broad support in the 
Parliament. Conservatives supported it because they don't favor any kind of privatization. 
Interestingly, reformers supported it too mostly because they wanted to buy some time to 
study the privatization process and influence it before it went too far. Having mostly just The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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been elected to the Parliament, reformers did not feel comfortable with allowing rapid 
progress of a process they did not yet understand.  
In early 1995, the Parliament adopted a list of enterprises not to be subject to 
privatization, and the moratorium was lifted. After this act, the pace of privatization once 
again quickened.  
 
5. Corporatization  
Corporatization was originally viewed as a part of the privatization process, to be 
undertaken once an enterprise began privatizing. In June 1993 this changed with the 
issuance of a new corporatization decree. Through the decree, enterprises were to be 
transformed into joint-stock companies in which all shares held by the government were 
transferred to the State Property Fund. The decree and subsequent Cabinet of Ministers 
procedures specified instructions for choosing boards of directors and drafting charters 
and by-laws.  
Corporatization continued to be a part of the privatization process for medium and 
large enterprises. Additionally, many enterprises not intended soon for privatization also 
began a process of corporatization. Unfortunately, enterprises targeted for corporatization 
generally did not do so as quickly and as widely as was envisioned by the law and 
regulation. From June 1993, corporatization proceeded in an ad hoc, disorganized 
manner. in November 1994, a streamlined scheme for corporatization was written into the 
presidential decree that launched the mass privatization effort.  
 
6. Privatization Organs and Individuals  
Primary responsibility for privatization was originally given to two bodies — the 
State Property Fund and the Ministry for Destatization. These two bodies, along with the 
Committee for the Support of Entrepreneurship, came under the jurisdiction of State 
Minister Volodymyr Lanovoi. (The position of State Minister was eventually abolished in 
a later reform of government structures.) Because of political opposition to the first D. Snelbecker 
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Minister of Destatization, Victor Salnikov, a conservative, the Ministry was given almost 
no power and was eventually eliminated even though Salnikov was later replaced by 
Roman Shpek, a reformer.  
The State Property Fund took the lead role in preparing privatization normative acts 
and in managing the privatization process, in collaboration with many other organs. De 
jure the State Property Fund worked as an independent agency, reporting directly to the 
Parliament. De facto, the Fund worked like most ministries, reporting up the chain of 
command to the Cabinet of Ministers. (The most recent Chairman of the Fund was made a 
member of the Cabinet of Ministers, increasing the Government's control over the Fund.) 
Some normative acts were written and issued by the Fund after consulting with the 
Cabinet of Ministers, other ministries, and outside advisors. Other more important 
documents were written by the Fund and sent to the Cabinet of Ministers for revision and 
formal introduction as Cabinet decrees. The most important documents, such as laws, 
presidential decrees, and the annual privatization programs, were written by the Fund with 
broad input from other organs, sent to the Cabinet of Ministers for revision and approval, 
and then sent to the President's administration or to the Parliament for revision and final 
approval.  
The State Property Fund oversaw almost all aspects of privatization implementation. 
However many other cooks worked in the privatization kitchen. The Antimonopoly 
Committee participated in the privatization of enterprises occupying a monopoly position 
in their markets. The Ministry of Finance participated in the licensing and regulation of 
financial intermediaries, and oversight of circulation of privatization certificates. The 
State Savings Bank distributed the privatization certificates. Independent auditors 
appraised property. Non-governmental privatization certificate auction centers, 
established with USAID support, collected bids from citizens and financial intermediaries 
during 1995's mass privatization attempts, determined clearing prices and distributed 
shares. All these organs collaborated with the Fund in writing relevant law and regulation.  
The State Property Fund was first headed by Volodymyr Pryadko. According to 
many western observers, Pryadko played a very passive role, reluctant to push 
privatization aggressively or to take public stands. His tenure lasted throughout the 
presidency of Leonid Kravchuk, a leader who similarly preferred politics over policy and The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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who did not see privatization implementation as a top priority. The second Ukrainian 
President, Leonid Kuchma, took seriously the tasks of economic reform, among them 
privatization. Because of the new presidency and the new Parliament's dissatisfaction with 
privatization in 1994, Pryadko was fired (eventually along with senior State Property 
Fund staff) and replaced with Yuri Yekhanurov, an experienced economic policymaker. 
Compared to Pryadko, Yekhanurov was far more dedicated to pushing the privatization 
process faster. With new leadership in the Presidency and the Fund, a recognition in the 
Parliament and other political circles that fundamental change in the privatization 
program was needed, and increased western support, the government adopted a new mass 
privatization program by Presidential Decree in November 1994. Without the rise of 
Kuchma and Yekhanurov, it is possible that the new mass privatization program (quite 
ambitious at least on paper) would never have been adopted under the previous leaders.  
Compared to its counterpart in Russia (the State Committee for Property), the State 
Property Fund has been quite weak, politically. The Fund has primary responsibility for 
crafting the details of privatization policy, but any major decisions could only be made 
with the input of at least the Cabinet of Ministers. Neither Pryadko nor Yekhanurov were 
given the power and authority that Chubais achieved in Russia. Although many key 
senior leaders in the Cabinet of Ministers during these years strongly supported 
privatization (Volodymyr Lanovoi, Victor Pynzenyk, Roman Shpek, etc.), the dispersion 
of decision making responsibility to so many people and agencies greatly hurt the process. 
Since the head of the Fund did not have sufficient power and since senior Cabinet of 
Ministers officials had a host of other economic issues to address in addition to 
privatization, Ukraine's privatization program seemed frequently to be drifting like a 
captainless ship.  
The State Property Fund had several problems internally that greatly impeded its 
work. Among the most important problems during the first several years of privatization 
was that the local privatization funds, with jurisdiction over privatization of municipal 
property (mostly small enterprises), were autonomous from the central State Property 
Fund in Kiev. Rather than reporting to the central Fund, municipal funds reported to their 
local governments, making it impossible for the central Fund to implement its mandate of 
privatizing the nation's enterprises. Much political effort was expended to solve this D. Snelbecker 
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problem by creating a unified system of privatization bodies, with local funds directly 
subordinated to the central Fund.  
Another important problem that plagued the Fund was that it had few financial 
resources to attract sufficient numbers of competent, motivated people to its staff, both at 
the central and municipal levels, and that it received almost zero direct western assistance. 
In Russia, large sums of western assistance were devoted to assisting the State Committee 
for Property (GKI) and for creating a non-governmental policymaking counterpart to the 
GKI, the Russian Privatization Center (RPC). This assistance allowed the GKI and RPC 
to attract top-level western advisors and to offer competitive salaries to competent 
Russian experts in order to draft and implement sound privatization policy.  
In Ukraine, tens of millions of dollars of western assistance were spent on advisors 
in the field to help implement privatization and in the direct costs of privatization (such as 
printing paper privatization certificates), but no money was spent on long-term inside 
advisors to help the Fund draft and implement privatization policy. The unwillingness or 
inability to provide long-term inside western advisors to the Fund or to support the work 
of Ukrainians at the Fund is one of the great failures of western assistance to Ukraine and 
partially explains why Ukraine's privatization has lagged so far behind Russia's.  
 
7. Ukraine's Revised Mass Privatization Program  
In November 1994 in order to address many problems in the Ukrainian privatization 
program, President Kuchma signed a Decree "On Measures for Ensuring the Rights of 
Citizens to Use Their Privatization Certificates." The Program had the strong support of 
the World Bank, USAID and EC TACIS, whose consultants advised on the drafting and 
implementation of the program. This Decree outlined a revised mass privatization 
program. The program applied to enterprises in Groups B, C and D, specifically to 8000 
that were to have been put on a list by the Cabinet of Ministers.  
The Decree specified that enterprises would be valued based on their 1 January 1995 
book value, rather than the previous cumbersome process. Privatization commissions 
were simplified, to include a representative of privatization authorities, the top manager, The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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the head accountant, and in some cases a representative from the Anti-Monopoly 
Committee. The privatization plan, the articles of incorporation as an open stock 
company, the plan for share distribution, and other legally required documents were 
standardized and mandated to be completed in a short time.  
Top managers were given a right to purchase up to five percent of the shares in the 
enterprise at nominal value, paying for the shares over the course of a year.  
Paper privatization certificates were to be distributed to the population in place of 
the old system of certificates on account.  
The Decree mandated that 100% of shares of Group B enterprises, no less than 70% 
of shares of Group C, and up to 70% of shares of Group D enterprises would either be 
given to workers at privileged terms or would go through certificate privatization 
auctions. Additional shares would be used to compensate citizens for the losses that have 
been incurred in their savings accounts due to inflation, in exchange for compensation 
certificates that would be printed at a later time. Remaining shares would be privatized 
after 1 January 1996 for cash.  
The revised mass privatization program, at least initially, was not successful. In the 
first five months of implementation of the Program, less than 200 enterprises were 
privatized, out of 8000 targeted for 1995. Partially, this sluggishness was caused by a rule 
requiring that shares offered in nationwide certificate auctions from an enterprise must be 
sold above a minimum price, which was based on book value. In most cases, insufficient 
numbers of shares were bid to cover the nominal prices of offered shares, so enterprises 
were considered undersubscribed and no shares were sold. An even deeper problem, 
however, lay in the fact that far too few enterprises were being supplied to the mass 
privatization program. Auction bid centers were established throughout the country with 
USAID assistance, but they had few enterprises to sell. As a result, so-called mass 
privatization was proceeding even more slowly than the case-by-case privatization. 
 D. Snelbecker 
CASE Foundation  18
 8. Privatization in Ukraine Quantified  
It is very difficult to get a quantitative sense of the state of privatization in Ukraine. 
Statistics have not been collected in a thorough, organized, centralized manner. The 
Ministry of Statistics has not conducted or released an inventorization of Ukraine's 
medium and large enterprises, so State Property Fund officials and western advisors do 
not even know how many medium and large enterprises there are in Ukraine. There is a 
list of over 6000 medium and large enterprises that are subject to mandatory privatization, 
and there is a list of over 6000 enterprises for which privatization is forbidden. It is not 
clear how many thousands of enterprises may exist that are not on either list. It also seems 
that some enterprises are on both lists, some enterprises on the lists are not really 
enterprises, and some on the lists may even not exist. Similar problems exist in counting 
small enterprises, with estimates of the total number of small enterprises varying by tens 
of thousands.  
Much information regarding the details of privatization of medium and large 
enterprises is collected by local property funds and perhaps not fully reported to the 
central State Property Fund in Kiev. As a result, for instance, it is not known what portion 
of shares in enterprises, on average, is acquired by workers and managers on privileged 
terms. Also, according to some accounts, the Ministry of Statistics may report many 
enterprises as privatized when in fact they have only been corporatized and remain in 
state control.  
The following numbers, reported by Taisia Voronkova at the Center for Economic 
Development in Kiev, based on materials from the Ministry of Statistics and the European 
Centre for Macroeconomic Analysis, provide a general picture of the state of privatization 
in Ukraine, even though the numbers may contain significant inaccuracies.  
 
 The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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Table 1: Privatization of Enterprises by Group  
 
  All SOEs   SOEs owned at  
national level 
SOEs owned at 
municipal level 
 Privatized in all groups 
(1992 _ 1 July 1995) 
14856 5735 9121   
Of which, by %:     
Group A  74.6  44.3 93.5  
Groups B, C, D  25.0  55.4 5.9  
Group E  0.4  0.3 0.6  
 Planned priv. in 1995  30450  10120 20330  
Of which actually priv. 
in 1st half 1995, % 
10.7 13.3 9.4   
Of which:     
Group A planned  22450  3720 18730  
Group A actual, %   9.6  10.8 6.8  
Groups BCD planned  8000  6400 1600  
Groups BCD actual, %  13.4  14.7 8.1  
Group E planned  1200  - -  
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Table 2: Privatization of Enterprises by Means of Privatization  
  All SOEs   SOEs owned at  
national level 
SOEs owned at 
municipal level 
Privatized by all means 
(1992 _ 1 July 1995) 
14856 5735  9121   
Of which, by %:       
buyout & lease/buyout  73.4  60.0  81.8  
auction, tender  10.9  3.3  15.7  
sale of shares  15.7  36.7  2.5  
 Privatized by all means 
(1st half 1995) 
3253 1342  1911   
Of which, by %:       
buyout & lease/buyout  58.1  24.9  82.2  
auction, tender  9.4  3.3  13.9  
sale of shares  32.5  71.8  4.9  
 
Table 3: Numbers of Privatized Enterprises by Method (1993, 1994)  
 1993  1994   
Buyers' assoc. buyout  1403  3157 
Buyout by alternative plan  64  87 
Buyout from leasing  1319  2886 
Sale at auction  260  396 
Non-commercial tender  141  173 
Commercial tender  133  196 
Commercial tender with 
delayed  payment 
7 - 
Free transfer  -  67 
Sale of shares of open  
join-stock co. 
219 986 
 Total  3555  7947 The Political Economy of Privatization... 
CASE Foundation  21
 
Table 4: Privatization by Form of Property (1993, 1994)  
Level of Ownership  1993  1994  
National 1596  7947 
Municipal 1959  5251 
Total   3555  7947 
 
 
Table 5: Pace of Privatization  
Quarter  Cumulative Number of 
Privatized Enterprises  
1992 Q4  30  
1993 Q1  430  
1993 Q2  830  
1993 Q3  1,685  
1993 Q4  3,585  
1994 Q1   5,442  
1994 Q2  8,402  
1994 Q3  10,214  
1994 Q4  11,552  
1995 Q1  12,802  
1995 Q2  14,957  
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PART II: AN ANALYSIS OF UKRAINIAN PRIVATIZATION  
In the 1980s, governments all around the world began privatizing utilities, 
companies that extract natural resources and other so-called "natural monopolies" and 
"strategic" enterprises. This privatization trend spread through much of the Third World 
and the developed economies.  
If the 1980s can be characterized as the Era of Privatization, then the first half of the 
1990s must be named the Era of Mass Privatization, during which most countries of the 
formerly socialist bloc attempted ambitious privatization programs for whole economies. 
At first, policymakers and scholars working in East European countries assumed they 
faced issues similar to those confronted by their counterparts in the 1980s. Over a short 
time, however, this belief proved false, as mass privatization of the 1990s turned out to be 
an entirely different animal from the 1980s breed. Post-socialist privatization required 
ownership transformations on an unprecedented scale — thousands of large enterprises to 
be privatized within several years, compared to the handfuls of enterprises involved in 
First and Third World privatization programs. Furthermore, post-socialist economies 
lacked many kinds of market institutions, such as capital markets, which made market 
valuation of enterprises impossible. They also lacked an appropriate legal infrastructure, 
banking systems, western-style accounting standards, wealthy investors, and skilled 
policymakers, business managers, and accountants [2].  
Successful mass privatization in any post-socialist country requires compromise 
between economic goals and political constraints. Economically, mass privatization must 
transfer state- owned enterprises to private ownership is a way that maximally encourages 
restructuring and efficient operation. Politically, mass privatization must provide enough 
incentives to key groups in the society so that sufficient support is raised for mass 
privatization to be implemented.  
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1. The Economics of Mass Privatization  
The following points on the economics of mass privatization are important:  
−  The purpose of privatization is to separate enterprises from the state, depoliticizing 
them so that managers pursue profit- maximizing strategies under hard budget 
constraints rather than seeking subsidies and special privileges (ie, rents) from the 
government. [3]  
−  Privatization must establish private property rights and institutions. Chief among 
these rights must be the right of owners to use the enterprise as they see fit within 
certain legal limits. This of course includes the right to make basic production 
decisions, to make enforceable contracts with suppliers and customers, and to set 
prices.  
−  Capital markets must be created that give owners the right and ability to sell their 
property freely. Through such markets, owners who run their enterprises poorly will 
frequently sell to new owners who are better able to manage them. Also through 
capital markets, prices of stocks will provide signals about the health of companies.  
−  Privatization should encourage core investors to the extent possible (ie, investors 
who own relatively large blocks of shares). Core investors are better able to manage 
and restructure enterprises than are small shareholders. Core investors are also more 
likely to inject capital into the enterprise or to attract new capital from outside 
sources, and they will be strong enough to safeguard shareholders' rights.  
−  Privatization should encourage investment into enterprises to the extent possible. 
Restructuring enterprises requires money. Old equipment needs to be sold (rarely) or 
junked (more likely), new equipment must be purchased, and employees need to be 
trained or retrained.  
−  To succeed, privatization must be accompanied by other key economic reform 
measures—stabilization and convertibility of the money, liberalization of prices and 
domestic and foreign trade, reduction of the budget deficit, reform of the tax system D. Snelbecker 
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so that revenues are collected without overly burdening enterprises, etc. Tight 
monetary policy is particularly important for reducing the incentives to enterprises 
to stay in the state sector by reducing overall subsidies.  
 
The current privatization process in Ukraine only partially has achieved these 
objectives. Formally, privatized enterprises are separated from the state budget, and the 
state does not interfere in basic production decisions. However it is still too early to tell 
the extent to which privatized enterprises are becoming depoliticized, turning their 
attention to markets and to internal restructuring rather than focusing on government 
relations. Development of capital markets and laws and institutions to protect private 
property has occurred quite slowly, which is to be expected given the low portion of the 
economy that has already crossed into the private sector. Only after a larger constituency 
of private enterprises in the formal sector has developed can there be substantial progress 
towards these economic goals.  
Privatization has somewhat been encouraged by macroeconomic stabilization and 
liberalization of the economy. The scarcity of credits from the government due to 
stabilization has greatly reduced the incentives for managers to stay in the state sector. 
Much greater financial discipline will be needed however to push greater numbers of 
enterprises into private ownership. This is especially true for the agricultural industrial 
complex, which continues to draw inflationary credits from the state budget.  
A number of economic problems in Ukraine's privatization process are caused by the 
fact that it is very difficult for large investors to participate in Ukrainian mass 
privatization. Large active investors cannot directly buy shares in enterprises that 
participate in mass privatization, nor can they buy privatization certificates directly from 
citizens. The only ways they can acquire controlling packets of shares are to form 
financial intermediaries or to buy shares on the secondary market after privatization. 
Buying shares on the secondary market would be slow and costly since shares likely will 
be widely dispersed, and the markets will not soon function efficiently. Two kinds of 
financial intermediaries considerably could play the role of core investors - - investment 
funds and trust companies. Investment funds, however, are limited in the portion of shares The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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they can acquire in any one enterprise. They therefore are likely to be passive investors — 
speculators. And trust companies, which are not limited in the portions of shares they can 
acquire, also are unlikely to become active investors. Since they were entirely 
unregulated, they too tend to be passive speculators, engaging in everything from 
certificate privatization to pyramid scams. (A new privatization security, called 
compensation certificates, to be introduced in late 1995 or early 1996, would be tradable, 
allowing better access by large investors to privatization through the possibility of trading 
blocks of certificates for blocks of shares.)  
The barriers to participation by core investors are bad for several reasons. Because 
few outsiders have controlling packets of shares, there may be nobody who has the 
interest and ability to restructure enterprises and to run them efficiently. Small individual 
investors would not be able to organize themselves. As a result, control would be left in 
the hands of existing managers, as it is before privatization, without any efficiency gains. 
Without core investors, enterprises will find it harder to raise capital. Usually, capital is 
most likely to come either directly from core investors or from other outside investors 
who decide to invest in the company because they see a core investor whom they can trust 
to manage the investment wisely. Privatization without core investors may lead to control 
structures similar to Yugoslavia, where ineffective worker councils control enterprises, 
even if the majority of shares are in the hands of small outsider shareholders.  
Perhaps most importantly, outside core investors may be less likely to focus as many 
resources on seeking subsidies from the central government than current enterprise 
directors, who developed professionally in an environment where the central government 
was the only source of inputs and credits. Compared to current managers, outside core 
investors may be more interested in maximizing profits rather than breaking hard budget 
constraints.  
Core investors have both the profit motive and the power of concentrated ownership 
to overcome resistance to reform. Core investors in Russia and more so in Czechia have, 
on some occasions, successfully thrown out old management in order to launch 
restructuring [4].  D. Snelbecker 
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In Czechia, there were two means through which core investors could participate. 
Large investors could simply buy a portion of shares directly from the state without 
touching those shares that go for voucher privatization. Or intermediary funds could trade 
blocks of vouchers for controlling packets of shares in enterprises. Intermediary funds are 
the most common large investors. Intermediary funds own more than 20% of shares in 
787 companies and more than 50% in 334 companies. Although small individual 
shareholders own many of the shares in enterprises, it can be argued that core investors 
own enough shares in most enterprises to control them. Individual investors are too 
dispersed to have a voice; among those investors who own sufficient numbers of shares to 
have voice, ownership is sufficiently concentrated for certain owners to be able to exert 
control. According to one analysis of Czech privatization, "97% of all companies can be 
controlled by the coalition of the five largest shareholders" [5].  
In Russia, a different approach to encouraging large investors was taken. There 
would have been too much opposition to direct participation by outside investors initially 
in privatization because of the comparatively powerful industrial lobby. However, since 
certificates were freely tradable, it was possible for large investors to simply buy up 
certificates and then to acquire blocks of shares. In Russia, roughly one-fourth of the 
roughly 150 million vouchers were sold by citizens on the secondary market, and a third 
of vouchers were invested through Russia's 640 investment funds [6]. This allowed large 
investors to accumulate large blocks of vouchers, sometimes numbering into the millions, 
which they traded for large packets of shares in enterprises. Large investors also were able 
to participate in Russian privatization at later stages by buying shares in cash auctions, in 
which a portion of the cash was directed into the enterprise for the purpose of 
restructuring.  
The government of Ukraine could directly increase participation by large investors 
in the privatization process by allowing the free tradability of privatization certificates. 
Free tradability would allow large investors to accumulate blocks of certificates which 
they could trade for shares in enterprises, as was allowed in the Russian scheme. 
Although economically desirable, such a change is extremely unlikely because of 
continued political opposition to the idea of tradability. A more feasible way of 
encouraging participation by large investors would be to implement sales of packets of The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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shares, in exchange for cash, certificates, or investment promises. Such a scheme is 
described in a later section.  
Strengthening fiscal discipline, increasing liberalization of the economy, and 
drafting and enforcing better legislation to protect private property and promote capital 
markets are all additional measures that would promote the economic objectives of 
privatization.  
 
2. The Politics of Mass Privatization  
Turning to the political aspects, the following points are worthy of mention:  
−  The key to successful implementation of any mass privatization program is creation 
of incentives for important stakeholding groups in the society to support the 
program. Key stakeholders will include: workers and managers, powerful groups 
seeking to acquire enterprises, local governments, the national government (top 
government structures, branch ministries, the parliament), privatization authorities, 
and the people as a whole. Incentives can be created by granting cash or enterprise 
control rights. Most stakeholders must be given incentives; only a few stakeholder 
groups can be simply defeated politically.  
−  Mass privatization is war, not microsurgery. Mass privatization is a process of 
revolutionary transformation implemented by weak, overburdened governments in 
conditions of social chaos. Policies must bluntly stretch toward as many political 
and economic goals as possible in a very short time. Tweaking and refining policies 
until they approach perfection will usually end in delay and failure as the brief 
window of opportunity in each post-socialist economy quickly slams shut.  
−  Although the eventual goal of privatization is enterprise restructuring and not 
privatization merely for the sake of privatization, restructuring of enterprises during 
privatization almost never should be undertaken. If socialist governments could not 
manage state-owned enterprises efficiently for 50-70 years, then there is no reason 
to think that they could possibly restructure them now. The immediate goal of 
privatization should be to move enterprises through the privatization process as fast D. Snelbecker 
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as possible, recognizing that restructuring will best be done by new private owners. 
One exception to this rule might be in the case of monopolies and conglomerates, 
when the government may wish to split up enterprises into smaller units during 
privatization.  
−  Privatization processes should be kept as simple as possible, delegating as much 
privatization work as is possible from the central government to other capable 
governmental and non- governmental organizations.  
 
Of the above points on the politics of privatization, the current Ukrainian 
privatization procedures achieve several. The program is blunt, aimed at privatizing 
quickly rather than focusing on restructuring first. And, although the procedures are still 
quite complex, simplicity is at least recognized by Ukrainian policymakers and their 
western advisors as important, and much effort is devoted to devising simpler methods.  
Unfortunately, however, the most important political point, regarding the need for 
creating incentives for stakeholders, has been largely ignored by designers of the 
privatization programs. Primarily for this reason, privatization in Ukraine currently is 
failing.  
Although privatization in the long run should create many winners, it will also 
create a number of losers — groups in the society who benefit from the current system 
and who enjoy considerable controls and incomes that they stand to lose. These potential 
losers are likely to block privatization efforts. The success of a mass privatization 
program depends on its ability to pay off or co-opt a sufficient number of potential losers 
so that they at least do not block privatization and so that coalitions of potential winners 
are sufficiently stronger than remaining losers for the privatization program to prevail.  
A basic problem with Ukrainian privatization is that the program simply creates too 
few incentives for stakeholders to support it. Many key stakeholder groups receive little 
control and little cash in exchange for supporting privatization. Most importantly, workers 
and managers generally are unable to buy out their enterprises on privileged terms. Either 
they are not allowed to buy a sufficient portion of shares in their enterprises at privileged 
terms because of the nominal value of the enterprise assets relative to the number of The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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workers and the nominal value of privatization certificates, or they do not have sufficient 
cash even to buy shares at nominal value.  
Furthermore, almost no revenues are generated, so there are few financial incentives 
for stakeholders to participate. In Russia, portions of shares were sold for cash. This 
revenue was then used as a financial incentive for local governments and privatization 
authorities. Much of the cash earned in privatization went straight to the enterprises 
themselves to help with restructuring, giving a financial incentive to managers. The fact 
that privatization certificates could be sold for cash gave the public an incentive to 
participate in it. Without any of these financial incentives in Ukrainian mass privatization, 
many key stakeholders will be reluctant to support it, which may threaten its success.  
The barriers to participation by core investors further reduce incentives to support 
privatization. Mass privatization without core investors will be slower. Core investors 
frequently could push the privatization process so it proceeds quickly. They could hire 
consultants to help if necessary and confront the managers if the managers try to delay.  
Because Ukrainian mass privatization discourages participation of core investors, 
those core investors who want to invest in enterprises and the managers who want to work 
with them will try to keep their enterprises out of the mass privatization program. The 
difficulty the Cabinet of Ministers had in completing the list of enterprises to be 
privatized and the Parliament's opposition to finalizing the list both stem partially from a 
desire among certain groups to not lose good enterprises into the mass privatization 
process. As a result, mass privatization without core investors may lead to a program that 
includes only Ukraine's worst enterprises, with the best enterprises' going entirely to core 
investors completely separately from the certificate program.  
Mass privatization without core investors will be bad for Ukrainian citizens who 
have invested privatization certificates as well. Only core investors are strong enough to 
fight for the right of all shareholders against insiders, who will try to weaken ownership 
control. Small investors benefit if there are also large core investors who manage the 
enterprise effectively, defend shareholder rights, and raise capital. Small investors may 
lose if they are the only outside investors.  D. Snelbecker 
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For political reasons, as well as economic reasons, it would be advisable to increase 
the opportunities for participation by large investors in Ukrainian mass privatization. This 
would improve corporate governance, increase prospects for investment into 
restructuring, and improve political support for privatization among those investors 
wanting to acquire shares in enterprises and those enterprises seeking core investors.  
Both Czechia and Russia developed their own approaches to privatization that 
provided adequate incentives to key stakeholders. In Czechia, mass privatization 
succeeded because Czech leaders were able to build unified popular support around the 
principle that each Czech citizen was entitled to an equal share of property without 
anyone's receiving any special privileges. Mass support for this idea was built by a very 
active campaign in the mass media by Vaclav Klaus and other Czech leaders. Each citizen 
would have a choice of where to invest his or her privatization voucher; the government 
would not make investment decisions for the people.  
Furthermore, the government would not determine the exact course of privatization 
for enterprises. Rather, any organization or individual had a right to submit a privatization 
project, proposing how shares would be sold and distributed. This feature created 
flexibility and choice, most importantly for enterprise insiders, so that they could propose 
plans for privatization that most suited them. Because of the choice and flexibility they 
were given, opposition to mass privatization from managers and workers was far less than 
what it otherwise might have been.  
Although a pure voucher scheme was originally envisioned, the model that 
eventually developed was mixed, using both voucher sales through auction centers and 
direct sales to core investors for cash and/or investment promises. The former created 
incentives for the people as a whole to support privatization, and the latter created 
incentives for those seeking to acquire enterprises and for managers to support 
privatization. Because the Czech privatization program was able to build popular support 
through the voucher program and to minimize opposition from workers and managers 
through allowing these groups to submit privatization projects, it succeeded politically.  
Russian mass privatization also achieved political (as well as economic) success, 
though the Russian program was far more complicated politically than the Czech version, The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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reflecting the far greater number of political obstacles that were found in Russia than in 
Czechia.  
In Russia, there were more stakeholders than in Czechia. "The main stakeholders 
were the enterprise managers, who got substantial control over investment, employment, 
product development and many other decisions that were previously controlled by central 
ministries. The second key stockholders were the workers, who (unlike in Poland) did not 
have much control over decisions in the firm but did have, through their allies in the 
Parliament, effective veto power over any change in the legal ownership structure of the 
enterprise. The third key stakeholders were the local governments, which wanted 
enterprises to maintain employment and provide social services for the local residents, 
and controlled the supply of water, electricity, and other services to firms. Finally, the 
central ministries retained some control over firms in part because they could coordinate 
supply and distribution much better than enterprise managers." [7]  
All of the stakeholders gained something through privatization. Workers gained 
shares in their own enterprises on advantageous terms in several different ways depending 
on which privatization variant was chosen. Workers also received a share of the proceeds 
when their enterprise was sold [8].  
Many of the control rights to all workers really end up in the hands of managers 
because of the power managers have within the enterprise. Additionally, managers have 
the right to choose the privatization variant for their enterprise, which gives them 
considerable control over the privatization process.  
Local governments were given a share in the proceeds from the sale of certain 
enterprises. Local governments were not given shares in privatizing enterprises, for to do 
so would have compromised too much from an economic perspective. Branch ministries 
were given some authority to review privatization programs for certain large strategic 
enterprises, but they were not given much else. Finally, the public was given the right to 
participate in privatization through the voucher program. This created broad popular 
support for the program and gave it its initial momentum, especially since the vouchers 
were tradable so citizens had the choice of becoming shareholders or receiving cash.  D. Snelbecker 
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More recently, Russia has moved towards cash privatization, in which shares are 
sold to investors for cash rather than certificates. The shares being sold are mostly large 
minority packets of shares in enterprises that were held by the government while the rest 
of the shares went to insiders or to voucher privatization. The unique feature of Russian 
cash privatization is that most of the proceeds go into the enterprises being privatized. A 
smaller portion of the proceeds goes to privatization authorities and to local governments. 
Cash privatization makes sense economically because it provides enterprises with capital 
needed for restructuring and it brings in core investors who have a vested interest in the 
efficient operation of the enterprises.  
Politically, cash privatization provides financial incentives for many of the key 
stakeholders to support the process: managers receive infusions of capital for their 
enterprises, and local government and privatization agency officials receive a cut of the 
income. Central government officials receive political benefits from satisfying the capital 
needs of newly privatized enterprises [9].  
The Ukrainian program fails because it does not create the many incentives found in 
the Czech and Russian programs. Workers and managers receive little control or cash; 
large investors are mostly excluded from mass privatization; and there are no cash sales to 
generate revenues, which could be spread around to various stakeholder groups.  
The only significant incentive created by the Ukrainian program is through the 
certificate auction program, which stimulates some support among the general population 
for privatization in the abstract but does not create pressure to privatize any specific 
enterprises. Even this incentive is probably weaker than was the case in Czechia and 
Russia. First, the additional possibility of selling one's certificate to earn cash, which 
existed in Russia, is absent in Ukraine.  
Second, the Ukrainian certificate program suffered because it started after the post-
independence euphoria had dissipated and after programs in other countries had been 
implemented. This delayed start gave Ukrainian policymakers an opportunity to learn 
from the experiences of its neighbors. It also gave the Ukrainian people an opportunity to 
preview what they could expect from the process, and what they saw they did not like. It 
certainly is true that citizens of Russia, Czechia, and other countries received a small The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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benefit in return for their privatization vouchers and a large benefit from the opportunity 
to live in a privatized economy. However, this is not what Ukrainians saw and heard. 
What they saw and heard through their mass media is that their neighbors were being 
plagued with scandal after scandal: the St. Petersburg voucher thefts, the scams of MMM 
Invest and other financial intermediaries, bribery cases of even senior Czech privatization 
officials, etc. As a result, the attitude of Ukrainian citizens toward certificate privatization 
has generally been one of cynicism and apathy, as few Ukrainians bothered to acquire or 
invest their certificates. An emphasis by western donor public relations campaigns on 
family and security rather than on speculation sought to address this cynicism but did 
little to assuage it. The inability of citizens to sell their certificates for cash (as was 
possible in Russia) also did little to raise public interest in certificate privatization.  
Without substantial changes in the Ukrainian privatization program to dramatically 
increase incentives to key stakeholders, there would be little chance of ever meeting the 
ambitious targets of the program.  
 
3. Recommended Improvements to Ukraine's Privatization 
Program  
 
The privatization program of Ukraine needs to be changed to provide more 
incentives to key stakeholder groups in the society so that they will support privatization. 
Many of the possible changes that would address these issues would also improve 
economic aspects of privatization. (For instance, creating opportunities for core investors 
would improve corporate governance and increase the likelihood of investment, in 
addition to addressing political concerns.) Adopting the following suggested changes in 
the privatization program could substantially improve the prospects for successful 
privatization.  
−  Managers and workers could be given outright the right to acquire 51% of the shares 
in their enterprises. This measure perhaps more than any other would go furthest 
toward creating an effective incentive for one of the most influential stakeholder D. Snelbecker 
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groups in society to support privatization. However, this measure would have little 
likelihood of being adopted since it would be too great a departure from the current 
methods.  
−  Subtler ways could be found to increase the portion of shares in enterprises that are 
acquired by managers and workers. Managers and workers could be given the right 
to acquire more shares on privileged terms in exchange for cash or certificates. The 
purchasing power of their cash and certificates could be increased by multiplying by 
a special coefficient to be used only during "closed subscription." Certificates could 
be re-indexed upward so that manager and worker purchasing power increases (or 
nominal enterprise value could be indexed downward). (Re- indexation would also 
increase citizens' purchasing power.) Or, special privatization certificates could be 
distributed for the exclusive purpose of allowing workers and managers to acquire 
shares in their own enterprises. All these suggestions would require no or only 
minor changes in current privatization methodology.  
−  Privatization certificates could be made freely tradable, allowing large investors to 
buy blocks of certificates which then could be traded for blocks of shares. 
Tradability of certificates, like the 51% giveaway, would probably be too radical to 
be accepted. At a minimum, the government could follow through on plans to make 
compensation certificates fully tradable when they are introduced in late 1995 or 
early 1996. (Compensation certificates are an additional type of privatization 
security that have been planned for several years.)  
−  Packets of shares could be offered to core investors in sales for cash, certificates, or 
investment promises. So-called "investment tenders"—bidding in which participants 
compete partially based on investment pledges—would be particularly desirable 
because the incentive of cash for enterprises would raise manager and worker 
support for privatization. Investment tenders were written into the draft 1996 
Privatization Program that the State Property Fund submitted to the Cabinet of 
Ministers in October 1995.  
−  Workers could be given the option of "cashing in" their certificates during closed 
subscription, through which shares acquired by workers on privileged terms would The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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be collected from participants into packets and sold for cash in an immediate 
secondary sale, allowing better access to privatization by core investors and creating 
a cash incentive for workers, who would receive the proceeds of the sales. Such a 
scheme was written into the draft 1996 Privatization Program that the State Property 
Fund submitted to the Cabinet of Ministers in October 1995.  
−  The quota that 70% of shares in enterprises be sold for certificates could be greatly 
reduced. Only a small portion of shares in enterprises needs to be directed through 
certificate privatization auctions. These auctions only stimulate support among the 
general population but not among other key groups in the society. Setting quotas for 
certificate auctions too high does not leave sufficient shares left over to create 
incentives for other important groups.  
−  Cash earned by the government during privatization could be distributed to 
enterprises, local governments, privatization authorities, the state budget, etc., to 
stimulate broad support for privatization.  
−  A number of other measures could be undertaken, not directly related to increasing 
incentives. The rule preventing certificate sales of shares for lower than nominal 
value could be scrapped or circumvented; the procedures for privatization, 
especially in the agricultural-industrial complex, could be simplified and time 
periods shortened; etc.  
 
Many of the above recommendations would not require substantial changes in 
existing privatization law and regulation. However, they could radically alter the 
underlying incentives provided by the privatization program, greatly increasing prospects 
for success.  
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4. Conclusion: The Importance of a Conceptual Paradigm for 
Privatization  
How one thinks about privatization directly shapes the policies one promotes. 
Successes and failures in mass privatization experiences of Eastern Europe and the former 
Soviet Union can partially be traced to how architects of privatization schemes 
conceptualized the general privatization problem.  
Andrei Shleifer, a key architect of the successful Russian model, has characterized 
mass privatization as the redistribution of property rights (control rights and cash rights) 
from a system where property rights are ambiguous and conflicting to a system in which 
they are clear and privately held. His understanding is grounded in the stakeholder 
paradigm that also is the basis of this paper. "Companies in Eastern Europe in general, 
and Russia in particular, do not have an unambiguous de facto ownership structure, in 
which the government owns the shares. On the contrary, many 'stakeholders' have 
existing ownership rights, in the sense of being able to exercise control rights over assets 
effectively. Moreover, these stakeholders take both economic and political action to 
defend their rights. Unless these stakeholders are appeased, bribed, or disenfranchised, 
privatization can not proceed"(10).  
This application of property-rights concepts to the socialist pre-privatization context 
seems inappropriate at first glance. Most observers of socialist economies at the beginning 
of the decade would have said either that they had no system of property rights 
whatsoever, or that property rights rested in the hands of the state or the people as a 
whole. Such an observation, however, while perhaps true de jure, is quite far from the 
truth de facto. Shleifer's property-rights analogy, though not consistent with socialist 
property concepts, allows one to understand the confusing socialist SOE sector in terms 
familiar to western economists and legal experts.  
The property-rights analogy also provides a framework for understanding what 
privatization is and what is necessary for its success. Privatization is the re-allocation and 
clarification of property rights in order to create more efficient control structures. And, in 
order for privatization to succeed, it is necessary either to compensate existing property-The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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right holders (stakeholders) or to build sufficient political power to "confiscate" "property 
rights" from these holders.  
Other analogies used to describe mass privatization often miss these points. For 
instance, a surprising number of western advisors working on mass privatization have 
equated mass privatization with paper privatization certificates and certificate auctions. 
This has been the case in Czechia, Russia, and Ukraine. Although paper certificates and 
certificate auctions have been integral parts of mass privatization, they do not alone 
constitute mass privatization. They are a means, not an end. Specifically, they are, 
economically, a means of transferring property from the state to private individual and 
institutional investors and, politically, a means of building popular support for 
privatization. Also, although certificates are a piece of mass privatization, they are not the 
whole of mass privatization. In Czechia and in Russia, the blocks of shares that were sold 
for cash have been as important a piece of mass privatization as have the voucher 
programs, both for the economic goals of creating private (and, especially, large) owners 
and raising capital, and for the political goals of satisfying stakeholder demands.  
Another problematic analogy frequently applied to mass privatization is of supply 
and demand, where the government supplies the enterprises to the privatization process, 
and the citizens demand them by buying shares through voucher auctions. This analogy is 
simplistic on several counts. It wrongly assumes that the government is the whole 
owner/stakeholder of enterprises and that it can simply toss them on to the sales block 
without having to build support among many other stakeholders as a principal task of 
privatization. The analogy also exaggerates the power of the citizens participating in 
voucher programs. Although it is true voucher programs build general popular support for 
privatization, participating citizens are passive demanders. They have no way to cajole or 
coerce any one enterprise into entering the privatization process. Citizens are only one 
source of demand and, arguably, not the most influential. Finally, the supply- demand 
analogy implies that supply and demand must be distinct. In fact, a defining trait of mass 
privatization has been that, frequently, the enterprise is acquired by its own managers and 
workers; those who supply it to the privatization program are the very same people who 
demand it.  D. Snelbecker 
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The property-rights analogy proposed by Shleifer provides much better insight and 
practical guide for mass privatization than these other paradigms.  
Not only does Shleifer's property-rights analogy provide better insight than the other 
paradigms into why the Russian and Czech programs succeeded, it also helps to explain 
why other countries' large-enterprise mass privatization programs failed. The failure of 
Poland's program during 1990-1995, in particular, can best be explained by the fact that 
enterprise managers and workers and various groups in the Parliament, as well as other 
stakeholders, were not given sufficient incentives to support mass privatization. The main 
group who would gain from mass privatization is the general public, who would get 
intermediary fund shares. But the general public is poorly organized. They represent 
passive demand. They are unlikely to force specific enterprises to enter the privatization 
process or to force the Parliament and government to adopt needed laws and regulations.  
In Ukraine, western advisors exaggerated the importance of certificate auction sales 
in privatization, and they relied too heavily on a supply-demand paradigm and on a 
metaphor of an "enterprise supply pipeline," which somehow would carry all the state-
owned enterprises to the certificate auctions. Because of this conceptualization of the 
privatization problem, too much focus was placed on certificate auctions, too high a 
portion of shares was directed toward these auctions, and too little attention and assistance 
money was devoted to the vast sea of problems related to all aspects of privatization other 
than the certificate auctions. The idea of paper certificate auctions was superficially 
copied from Russia, but the whole purpose of the auctions as one instrument among many 
others for building stakeholder support was lost because the stakeholder paradigm was 
missing.  
In order to design practical improvements in Ukraine's privatization program, it 
would be necessary to start with a fundamental understanding of the power and interests 
of key stakeholders, and a recognition of how certificate auctions and other policy tools 
can create incentives to stimulate support for privatization among these stakeholders. On 
this foundation, with these tools, could be built a successful privatization program for 
Ukraine.  The Political Economy of Privatization... 
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